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All that says to me is that the Sec. of State either hasn’t considered the privacy implications, as even a rudimentary analysis shows the statement to be false, simply doesn’t care, or along the lines of Jeff’s links, thinks the possibility of surreptitious tracking is a feature not a bug.

You’re basically restating what I said here:

The only measure of safety encrypting the number provides is that the RFID tag could not be used to query the DHS database. Of course, since one’s name would be revealed in one of many transactions, even this layer of protection is transitory since the DHS database would contain both name and ID number.

The problem with folks piggybacking is they don’t need access to the DHS database to begin aggregating data based on the RFID signature.

There’s a common misconception that people have a single, invariable identity that can be violated. In truth, people have many identities. The average person has a government identity (SSNs, drivers’ licenses, passports, etc.), a financial identity (credit scores and history, financial records, etc.), a medical identity, a social identity, and a marketing identity (information held by advertisers about one’s preferences and habits).

These identities can exist separately, but they can be correlated when each has enough personally identifiable information. Third party trackers can build the identity of the encrypted signature and then backfill that to find out personally identifiable information leaked through everyday transactions.

With enough personally identifiable information, even the DHS database is an open book. If I have someone’s name, address, date of birth, and social security number, I will be able to find them in the DHS database, even if I don’t know their unencrypted RFID number.

Encryption of the static RFID number simply falls below any reasonable threshold of privacy. Temporal encryption with a one-time code increases the attack surface of the system dramatically, closing one hole by opening another. Encryption is simply not the answer to this problem.

The button idea is interesting, though. In theory, it could prevent the surreptitious reads necessary to do third-party tracking of the sort feared. I’ll have to look into it.

Perhaps you should be taken, very gently, into custody. And treated. This will be for your own good, and it will help you to feel all bettter. And then become better. You do want to be healed, don’t you?

In the extreme, it would be possible for the government itself to leverage the work of the clearinghouse by purchasing the data and crossing it with the DHS database. While unlikely, this scenario is technically possible.

They’re already doing it. It’s foolish to think that they’d stop if the data got better.

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1215792529376.shtm

Instead, they’re offering to “enhance” our license by having a security interview, paying more, and then getting a wireless RFID chip in your license. While the first two requirements seem reasonable, if the part about the wireless RFID ……